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 Rousseau and the Paradox of the Nation-State 
 The nation-state, especially as it took shape in Europe during the 
nineteenth century, was perhaps the most paradoxical political institu-
tion of its age. Its impact on the modern world has been tremendous. 
Nation-states are basic constituents of modernity, providing the frame-
work in which most of us lead our lives, and nationality is one of the 
fundamental conditions shaping our personal identity. We live in a sys-
tem of territorial nation-states and see ourselves as belonging to one or 
more of them.  And yet, how problematic the institution seems when 1
expectations are weighed against outcomes. 
 Nineteenth-century liberals endorsed the nation-state as a means to 
progress. It would promote peace and stability, they said, by bringing 
political and national boundaries into alignment. It would set the 
groundwork for prosperity by transforming small states into large mar-
kets and for popular government by establishing liberal institutions re-
sponsive to the national will. The nation-state would encourage the 
liberty of individuals and peoples, the free development of the human 
spirit through meaningful communion with like-minded citizens. In 
some places and at some times it did all of these. Walter Bagehot saw 
nation-building as a necessary step toward progress; John Stuart Mill 
suggested that nation-states were a precondition for democracy; Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte taught that only by living in a nation could an individ-
 1
But what are nations? What are these groups which are so 
familiar to us, and yet, if we stop to think, so strange…? 
Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (1872)
Rousseau and the Nation-State
ual gain access to the “eternal and the divine.” But no one was as opti-
mistic as Giuseppe Mazzini, for whom nations were God’s chosen way 
for men and women to work for the well-being of all humanity. Some-
day, he prophesied, Europe would conform to God’s plan: nations and 
states would become coterminous and then “harmony and fraternity” 
would prevail.  2
 And yet, the nation-state was an institution born of conflict. The 
wars of Italian and German unification, which disturbed the long nine-
teenth-century peace, and the Balkan wars of the early twentieth centu-
ry, which led to the horrors of World War I, make this abundantly clear. 
Despite what its champions might have thought, the nation-state was 
an abstraction confronting an intransigent reality. It could never have 
coalesced in its pure form because nationalities with unambiguous iden-
tities and borders simply did not exist in Europe, and attempts to create 
it encountered insurmountable obstacles. Under these conditions, na-
tionalism became strident and exclusive. Its politics became authoritari-
an, as aspiring nation-states discriminated against minorities, waged 
war on their neighbors, and demanded sacrifices from their citizens that 
might reasonably be construed as antithetical to freedom. An institu-
tion that many liberals hoped would bring peace, prosperity and free-
dom to Europe had just as often yielded contrary results. 
 This essay contends that a reading of Rousseau’s Social Contract, set 
against the eighteenth-century state system, reveals one way in which 
political thinking at the end of the Enlightenment anticipated this 
paradox. Neither nationalism nor the nation-state were fully developed 
concepts at the time Rousseau was writing, though glimpses of them 
appear in his works, suggesting in hindsight just how problematic the 
emerging nation-state might be. Rousseau’s Social Contract is a complex 
work of political philosophy, and no one who has read it carefully can 
deny that it contains any number of ambiguities. Its purpose was to 
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delineate the perfect republic, to indicate how people should organize 
themselves politically to bring about the maximum degree of human 
freedom. But the matter was not that simple. Rousseau did not confine 
his republic to an idealized setting. He placed it within an international 
order, one state among many, and knew that it would need to defend 
itself. He may have designed the republic for liberty and self-govern-
ment, but he equipped it for war. In the process, he endorsed a model 
of human association that, while possibly suitable for defense, insisted 
on uniformity and was not afraid to use coercion in order to achieve it. 
Rousseau’s Social Contract was a work of philosophy discussing ideas, 
not lived experience. But to the extent that ideas reflect behavior, it 
provides insights into why the emerging nation-state was often accom-
panied by war, an emphasis on social conformity, and a tendency to-
ward authoritarian politics. 
1 
 Rousseau—if we believe his Confessions—began thinking about 
political institutions in 1743 or 1744, while serving in Venice as private 
secretary to the French ambassador.  He worked hard at his job and 3
studied the art of diplomacy, a profession he hoped to make his own. 
This preoccupation with foreign affairs suggests that war and in-
ternational relations were never far from his mind as he began the train 
of thought that would lead eventually to the Social Contract of 1762. 
He began these speculations during the War of the Austrian Succession 
and finished them as the Seven Years War was coming to an end. To 
read Rousseau’s political thought, then, against the eighteenth-century 
state system is not out of place. For in the Social Contract, Rousseau 
described the self-governing association, or republic, and asked how it 
might survive in a world of predatory states. An answer to that very 
practical question formed part of the book’s original design. 
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 This question was not new. Republican theorists, from the early 
Renaissance onward, had pondered the rise and fall of republics, paying 
particular attention to how the republic should defend itself in a hostile 
international system. Florentine civic humanism had made the repub-
lic’s survival depend on the ability of its citizens to fulfill their responsi-
bilities and bear arms in its defense. Fifteenth-century Italy was a land 
of independent regional states, all potentially in competition with one 
another. By the end of the century, Europe’s great territorial monarchies 
had started to intervene on the peninsula as well. The struggle between 
Milan and Florence was paramount at the beginning of the fifteenth 
century; the involvement of France, Spain and the Empire in Italian 
affairs was crucial at its end. Confronted by rivals, the Florentines artic-
ulated a civic humanism that called on citizens to lead virtuous public 
lives, to meet their civic responsibilities, to sacrifice private ambition for 
the common good, and to bear arms in defense of the republic. Machi-
avelli in particular understood the problem as a contest between virtù 
and fortuna, between the spirit of the republic’s citizens and the blind 
forces of chance. Service in the militia became for Machiavelli the high-
est expression of republican virtue, as the citizen-soldier renounced pri-
vate interests in order to defend the republic and impose order on recal-
citrant fortune.  4
 Rousseau’s Europe was as subject to fortune as Machiavelli’s Italy. 
The state system as it developed from the War of the Austrian Succes-
sion to the Seven Years War was essentially anarchic. There were no in-
stitutions capable of enforcing a lawful international order: the Empire 
and Papacy had lost whatever influence they might have once possessed, 
while the concert of Europe had not yet come into being. Contempo-
raries might have thought a balance of power regulated the system just 
as naturally as the law of supply and demand regulated the marketplace. 
But the balance of power, as the eighteenth century understood it, did 
not guarantee peace. War played an integral part in maintaining the 
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balance because states had to make good on the threat of war in order 
to prevent hegemony. In practice, the period saw conflict as dynastic 
states competed for advantage and as statesmen employed war as nor-
mal policy, seeking to expand and acquire territory in compensation for 
gains made by rival states.  Bellicose as it was, this reality would enable 5
Rousseau to argue, without fear of contradiction, that the social state, as 
opposed to the state of nature, was distinguished by war. 
 Dynastic ambition characterized the War of the Austrian Succes-
sion (1740–1748) from beginning to end. Frederick the Great desired 
to enhance Prussia’s power and prestige by seizing Silesia. Charles Albert 
of Bavaria hoped to capture Bohemia and the title of Holy Roman Em-
peror. Maria Theresa needed to defend her territorial inheritance and 
claim the imperial title for her husband, Francis Stephen of Lorraine. 
The Spanish monarchs, Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese, sought a suit-
able principality in Italy for Elizabeth’s youngest son, while Charles 
Emmanuel III desired to expand Piedmont-Sardinia’s power in Italy at 
the expense of Spain and Austria. These were the rivalries and ambitions 
plaguing Europe as Rousseau arrived in Venice in 1743.  Behind them 6
lurked the great struggle between Habsburg and Bourbon for domi-
nance in Europe, and between England and France for control of the 
seas. When Rousseau complained that kings had only two functions, 
“extending their domination abroad and rendering it more absolute at 
home,” he knew what he was talking about.  7
 These rivalries persisted into the next decade, laying the ground-
work for the Seven Years War (1756–1763). Anglo-French competition 
led to war in the colonies, especially North America, while Austro-
Prussian enmity—Frederick’s desire to hold on to Silesia, Maria There-
sa’s determination to win it back—brought war to the continent. The 
intervention of Russia and the failure of the European states to defeat 
Prussia led to the consolidation of the great power system in which 
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Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia dominated continental af-
fairs while the lesser powers played a subservient role.  No wonder, then, that Rousseau, who wrote the Social Contract just 8
that Rousseau, who wrote the Social Contract just as this system was 
coming into existence, asked of the ideal republic, “but if it is very 
small, will it be subjugated?”  The question of the republic’s survival in 9
an international order dominated by hostile powers was not simply one 
he inherited from the classic age of Florentine republican thinking; it 
was equally the question posed by the age of Frederick the Great. 
 Rousseau analyzed the European state system in a number of works 
that he wrote between 1743, when he arrived in Venice, and 1762, 
when he published the Social Contract.  Some, like the Discourse on the 10
Origins of Inequality and the article on “Political Economy” that he 
wrote for Diderot’s Encyclopedia, touched on the subject tangentially. 
Others, like his synopsis and criticism of Abbé de St Pierre’s Plan for 
Perpetual Peace, dealt with it directly, but are usually considered minor 
works. A number of fragments on war and peace make up yet a third 
category. All of these writings date to the years between 1754 and 1756, 
just before the Seven Years War, and all regard warfare as the natural 
condition of civilization, the inevitable consequence of man’s departure 
from the state of nature and his entrance into civil society. War, for 
Rousseau, was endemic to the eighteenth century and a structural com-
ponent of its state system. 
  In the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau made his 
case. Men and women in the state of nature were as a rule peaceful be-
cause a profound sympathy for all living creatures—what he called 
“pity”—tempered their propensity for self-preservation. The selfish pas-
sions that so often provoked conflict, he argued, famously controverting 
Hobbes, were simply not found there.  But no matter how idyllic this 11
natural state may have been, the human capacity for perfection eventu-
ally induced men and women to leave it behind and gather in society. 
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This transition was crucial for Rousseau’s thinking about war. Now that 
a social state had coalesced in which individuals judged themselves 
against others, those Hobbesian passions emerged. Pride in particular 
turned voluntary wrongs into outrages which the injured party had to 
avenge in deeds that were as cruel and bloodthirsty as the outrage was 
humiliating. Property similarly divided people, unleashing ambition 
and driving them to compete with each other to see who could accu-
mulate the most, not out of need, but simply out of a desire to raise 
themselves above others.  Pride and property: here were two condi12 -
tions that made war integral to human society as Rousseau understood 
it in the eighteenth century, when princes fought over parcels of territo-
ry in order to assuage slights to their prestige. “Nascent Society,” he 
concluded, “gave way to the most horrible state of war….”  13
 This progression to the social state was soon replicated everywhere. 
Men and women formed associations for self-preservation and the pro-
tection of property. They renounced their natural freedom, departed 
from the state of nature, and subjected themselves to the laws of civil 
society. One such association inevitably gave rise to others, ensuring 
that the earth became populated with competing nations. With only 
“tacit conventions” to regulate their conduct—what Rousseau called the 
right of nations—they engaged in mutual slaughter. “Hence arose Na-
tional Wars, Battles, murders, and reprisals which make Nature tremble 
and shock reason…,” Rousseau wrote in a passage conveying his disgust 
at what civilization often entailed. “The most decent men learned to 
consider it one of their duties to murder their fellows; at length men 
were seen to massacre each other by the thousands without knowing 
why; more murders were committed on a single day of fighting and 
more horrors in the capture of a single city than were committed in the 
state of Nature during whole centuries over the entire face of the 
earth.”  14
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 The character of the state, Rousseau continued, now approaching 
the subject from a different angle, also contributed to this condition of 
chronic warfare. In his article on “Political Economy,” he assigned the 
state a will, which he defined as an expression of sovereignty. In a re-
public, where the people were sovereign, the will was general. In a 
monarchy, where a prince was sovereign, the will was personal. In either 
case, the state was an active agent, exerting itself in the world, seeking 
to fulfill either the general will of the people or the personal will of the 
prince.  Eighteenth-century Europe, where all the emerging great pow15 -
ers were monarchies, was thus a system of willing, active states, all in 
competition with each other, as their sovereign princes sought to pro-
tect their prestige and augment their territory. What is more, the state 
was an artificial body without natural limits. Its potential for expansion 
was practically endless. Rousseau pointed out in one of his fragments 
on war that states constantly tried to overcome their vulnerabilities by 
expanding at the expense of their neighbors. Any state system, he con-
cluded, was therefore inherently unstable: as member states sought se-
curity through expansion, they inevitably threatened their neighbors, 
prompting retaliatory expansion in return.  16
 Rousseau’s conception of the prince as a willful actor on the in-
ternational stage informed his criticism of the Abbé de St Pierre’s plan 
for perpetual peace. The Abbé de St Pierre had suggested that Europe 
existed in a balance of power, a natural equilibrium that included a 
chronic state of war as one of its elements. This balance may have been 
natural and achieved without human effort, but it was flawed because it 
required war as the means of maintaining itself. The Abbé de St Pierre 
proposed to perfect this arrangement and achieve “a perpetual and uni-
versal peace” by organizing the states of Europe into a federation based 
on everything they held in common: religion, morals, customs, litera-
ture, institutions, laws, geography, commerce. The federation’s govern-
ing congress would guarantee peace by arbitrating disputes, enforcing 
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treaties and making decisions with the authority of law and backed by 
armed force.  Rousseau’s principal objection to this plan was that Eu17 -
rope’s princes would never consent to it because they were too indepen-
dent and irrational to be bound by anything. As willing sovereigns, 
princes rarely pursued their real interests, which might be fulfilled by 
peace, but rather pursued their apparent interests, which were more 
often fulfilled by war. Princes would never renounce the opportunity to 
extend their boundaries and increase their prestige. They would never 
subordinate themselves to the decisions of a tribunal since doing so 
would diminish that prestige by admitting weakness. What does a 
prince who goes to war risk except the lives of his subjects, Rousseau 
asked rhetorically? If he risked little, he chanced to gain much, since 
princely reputations were based largely on the ability to wage war.  18
 The fragments on war confirm this picture. There we find 
Rousseau’s well-known description of civilized Europe as a field of car-
nage: “I raise my eyes and look into the distance. I perceive fires and 
flames, deserted countryside, pillaged cities. Fierce men, where are you 
dragging those wretched people? I hear a frightful noise; what tumult! 
what cries! I draw near; I see a theater of murders, ten thousand slaugh-
tered men, the dead piled up in heaps, the dying crushed under the 
hooves of horses, everywhere the image of death and agony. This, then, 
is the fruit of these peaceful institutions! Pity, indignation raise them-
selves at the bottom of my heart. Ah barbarous philosopher! Come read 
us your book on a battlefield.”  So Rousseau rejected the Hobbesian 19
notion that warfare defined the state of nature. Instead, war arose later, 
once men and women had entered the civil state and nations populated 
the world. These nations, however, existed in a condition of anarchy 
with little to restrain them: natural law, which had earlier tempered 
human behavior, spoke only to individuals, not to nations; and in-
ternational law was meaningless because it had no sanction. In coming 
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together as nations, then, humankind created conditions that made war 
all but inevitable.  20
 Rousseau prefaced his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality with a 
dedication to the Republic of Geneva in which he expressed his wish to 
live in a country whose government was based on popular sovereignty. 
But he knew that such a republic would always be precarious in a world 
of predatory states. It would have to be so small, he warned, that it 
would not feel the temptation to conquer and so fortunately situated as 
to have friendly neighbors.  Only in such favorable circumstances 21
could a self-governing body of citizens hope to survive, and the likeli-
hood of finding such circumstances in the Europe of Frederick the 
Great was all but impossible. Like Machiavelli, then, Rousseau realized 
the precariousness of the republic, and like Machiavelli, he would call 
on its citizens to bear arms in its defense. 
2 
 In the Social Contract, Rousseau presented his conception of the 
ideal republic. His argument was notoriously complex—even ambigu-
ous—and these qualities have ensured that it has given rise to any 
number of competing interpretations. Without attempting to resolve 
these controversies, I simply want to point out a correlation between 
Rousseau’s awareness of the republic’s international precariousness and 
his understanding of its essential character: for the republic was ad-
mirably suited for the task of defense. The model that Rousseau had in 
mind as he wrote the Social Contract was the classic republic with its 
emphasis on civic virtue.  No wonder: previously, in his Discourse on 22
the Sciences and Arts, he had revealed a strong preference for the martial 
values associated with ancient republics: warlike Sparta, he proclaimed, 
was a “Republic of demi-Gods rather than men, so superior did their 
virtues seem to humanity.”  23
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 According to Rousseau, the republic originated in a voluntary act 
of incorporation whereby a number of people freely chose to submerge 
their individual wills beneath a general will. Here is how he first de-
scribed the process: 
If, then, we set aside from the social pact everything that is not es-
sential to it, we will find that it can be reduced to the following 
terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under 
the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body we receive every 
member as an indivisible part of the whole. Instantly, in place of the 
private person of each contracting party, this act of association cre-
ates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as 
there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act 
its unity, its common self, its life, and its will. This public person, 
formed by the union of all the other persons, formerly took the 
name City, and now takes that of Republic….  24
In his account of the republic’s origin, Rousseau borrowed from Roman 
law the concept of incorporation, which he found in Hobbes and 
which established how a number of individuals come together to form a 
single public person. Rousseau then made several claims regarding this 
act of incorporation. To begin with, it created an association that was 
more than a simple aggregation of people held together by force. It was 
an association with a common good, with a genuine source of internal 
unity, with the kind of cohesion that animated a living organism. Be-
cause the republic was a single person, it had a single will, which 
Rousseau called the general will. 
 This act of incorporation also produced an association that respect-
ed the freedom of each individual member. Since all citizens participat-
ed in the deliberations of the assembly, the general will came to repre-
sent their own best interests, and this responsiveness to the voice of 
every citizen was what Rousseau meant by popular sovereignty. In order 
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to preserve the generality of the will, the decisions of the assembly had 
to be binding on all its members, regardless of whether they were of the 
majority or not. Regarding those cases where private interests deviated 
from the general will, Rousseau’s judgment was chilling: “whoever re-
fuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire 
body; which means only that he will be forced to be free….”  Only 25
within an association of this sort, Rousseau continued, did people ac-
quire a moral sensibility. As they departed the state of nature and en-
tered the republic’s civil society, they became rational agents, acting ac-
cording to their sense of public duty rather than listening to their in-
stincts, impulses or desires.  The ideal republic was thus an association 26
of free and equal citizens, responding to a common will and working 
for a common good. 
 But in the real world, Rousseau acknowledged, the republic was 
vulnerable. Threatened by internal corruption and external conquest, it 
depended for its survival on the virtue of its citizens. Following the lead 
of his republican predecessors, Rousseau defined virtue as the propensi-
ty to place the public good above private interests: “Nothing,” he wrote 
in the Social Contract, “is more dangerous than the influence of private 
interests on public affairs…,” because whenever they dominate, the 
state is corrupted in its very essence.  As the main source of corrup27 -
tion, Rousseau pointed to luxury, a condition all healthy republics 
should avoid. Luxury divided citizens into social classes, thereby un-
dermining the republic’s cohesion, and bred indolence, enticing citizens 
to neglect their social responsibilities. As soon as they “serve with their 
pocketbooks rather than with their persons,” Rousseau warned in true 
republican fashion, “the State is already close to its ruin. Is it necessary 
to march to battle? They pay troops and stay home. Is it necessary to 
attend the Council? They name deputies and stay home. By dint of 
laziness and money, they finally have soldiers to enslave the country and 
representatives to sell it.”  28
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 Only virtuous citizens, then, had the ability to preserve the repub-
lic. They valued the public good above all else and participated directly 
in civic life so as to secure it, attending the assembly and bearing arms 
in the republic’s defense. Their manners and morals were simple; they 
were immune to the enticements of luxury, seeking neither comfort nor 
profit; they were forever vigilant, keeping watch on their governors and 
neighbors. They were free, equal and independent: “no citizen shall be 
so opulent that he can buy another,” Rousseau stipulated, “and none so 
poor that he is constrained to sell himself.”  Here were unmistakeable 29
echoes of the republican ideal as found in the works of Machiavelli and 
the other Florentines. Rousseau’s republic may have been small—and a 
small republic was preferable because it was uniform, cohesive and easy 
to administer—but no matter how small, it could defend itself by mus-
tering the collective strength of its members, and since it had the coher-
ence of a single person, it could direct this strength with a single will in 
order to achieve a single aim. 
3 
 Rousseau’s speculations were not all theoretical, and on at least two 
occasions he turned his attention to practical matters. In 1764, Matteo 
Buttafuoco, a Corsican soldier serving in the French army, invited 
Rousseau, now famous for the Social Contract, to design a political sys-
tem that would preserve Corsica’s freedom and independence. Several 
years later, around 1771, a convention of patriotic Polish aristocrats 
seeking their country’s independence from Russian interference, invited 
Rousseau to frame the best constitution possible for Poland. Both invi-
tations provided him with an opportunity to comment on real-world 
situations. His Considerations on the Government of Poland in particular 
addressed explicitly the problem of how the small republic should de-
fend itself in a world of hostile states. At times Rousseau pointed to 
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federalism as a possible solution: republics could keep their more pow-
erful neighbors at bay by uniting in a federation as the Swiss had done 
to protect themselves from Habsburg aggression. He recommended, for 
example, that the Poles divide their country into numerous small re-
publics and then unite them in a federation for defense.  Unfortunate30 -
ly, we know little more than this. Rousseau either destroyed, lost, or 
never wrote those sections of the Social Contract dealing with federal-
ism. Alternatively, republics could establish defensive alliances with 
more powerful neighbors. But Rousseau advised against this policy, not-
ing that treaties rarely worked to the advantage of small states. “Al-
liances, treaties, the faith of men, all these can bind the weak to the 
strong and never bind the strong to the weak,” he warned the Corsi-
cans: “Thus leave negotiations to the powers and do not count on any-
thing but yourself.”  31
 This last phrase—“do not count on anything but yourself ”—epit-
omized the republican ideal: instead of relying on others, the republic 
should call on the virtue of its citizens. It should foster their patriotism, 
encouraging them to put country before self, and organize them in a 
people’s militia for defense. This was his explicit advice to the Poles, and 
he pointed to the Social Contract for its theoretical justification. Poland 
was in a precarious position, surrounded by powerful and aggressive 
neighbors, all of whom had large armies at their command. Instead of 
trying to match these armies, which would only bankrupt the state, 
Poland should model itself on the Roman and Swiss republics and cre-
ate a citizen’s militia: “This militia will cost the Republic little, will al-
ways be ready to serve it, and will serve it well, because in the end one 
always defends one’s own possessions better than someone else’s.”  In 32
true republican fashion, Rousseau pointed out that a people’s militia, 
unlike a standing army, would pose no threat to liberty.  The militia’s 33
strength would reside in patriotism, in its “love of the fatherland and of 
freedom…. As long as this love burns in hearts it will perhaps not pro-
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tect you against a temporary yoke; but sooner or later it will explode, 
shake off the yoke and set you free. Work then without relaxation, 
ceaselessly, to carry patriotism to the highest degree in all Polish 
hearts.”  Rousseau finally indicated how to foster this patriotism 34
through proper education: “Upon opening its eyes a child ought to see 
the fatherland and until death ought to see nothing but it. Every true 
republican imbibes the love of the fatherland, that is to say, of the laws 
and of freedom along with his mother’s milk. This love makes up his 
whole existence; he sees only the fatherland, he lives only for it; as soon 
as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland, he 
no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.”  35
 Here we see the importance of patriotism for Rousseau’s thinking. 
The virtuous citizen must be a patriot, and the need to cultivate this 
patriotism placed certain conditions on the republic. In the first place, 
it required homogeneity. The republic emerged from an act of associa-
tion in which all citizens surrendered their individuality to the general 
will. If the republic was a collective person with a single will, then there 
could be no factions within it. There could be no self-governing associa-
tions within the republic, for that would divide the general will, would 
divide sovereignty, and would deprive patriotism of its object. The re-
public must be uniform—on this he was adamant: “For the same rea-
son that sovereignty is inalienable,” he wrote in the Social Contract, “it 
is indivisible. Because either the will is general or it is not. It is the will 
of the people as a body, or of only a part.”  For Rousseau, a divided 36
will meant a fragmented republic: 
…when factions, partial associations at the expense of the large 
one, are formed, the will of each of these associations becomes gen-
eral with reference to its members and particular with reference to 
the State…. When one of these associations is so big that it prevails 
over all the others,… then there is no longer a general will…. In 
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order for the general will to be well expressed, it is therefore impor-
tant that there be no partial society in the State….  37
Uniformity, then, was the precondition for patriotism: citizens must be 
loyal to the republic, not to particular sections within it. The republic 
required that all other loyalties be erased. Patriotism, like sovereignty, 
could not be divided. 
 This need for homogeneity also explained in part Rousseau’s prefer-
ence for small states. He objected to the regional divisions that in-
evitably developed in large republics and that detracted from their uni-
ty. Different regions, he noted, each with their own environments and 
customs, created different kinds of people with different characteristics. 
“The same laws cannot be suited to such a variety of provinces, which 
have different morals, live in contrasting climates, and cannot tolerate 
the same form of government.” Thus large states would require several 
different legal systems. But “different laws only produce discord and 
confusion among peoples who, living under the same leaders and in 
continuous communication, move and get married in each other’s areas, 
and, being subjected to other customs, never know whether their pat-
rimony is really theirs.”  No one, we might add, would feel patriotic 38
toward a patrimony that was not one’s own. Instead, it was small groups 
of people, those who were “already bound by some union of origin, 
interest or convention,” that provided the most suitable material for a 
republic.  39
 But most important, the people must be malleable, for Rousseau 
knew that nations had to be made. When individuals joined the repub-
lic, they acquired the positive freedom to become part of the social 
whole, to merge into that single corporate entity we call the nation. It 
was the operation of the republic’s institutions and laws that carried out 
this transformation. Education, Rousseau had advised the Poles, pro-
vided one way to shape a pliable citizenry into a nation, and the opera-
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tion of the laws provided another. The process of ascertaining the gen-
eral will brought into focus the common interests that united the peo-
ple and pushed to the margins those that did not. Finally, Rousseau 
envisioned a civil religion animating the entire republic and generating 
the highest form of patriotism. Each republic, he wrote in the Social 
Contract, should have its own religion, with its own gods, dogmas and 
rituals defined by law. This religion, “by making the fatherland the ob-
ject of the Citizens’ adoration,… teaches them that to serve the State is 
to serve the tutelary God. It is a kind of Theocracy in which there 
ought to be no other pontiff than the Prince, nor other priests than the 
magistrates. Then to die for one’s country is to be martyred, to violate 
the laws is to be impious….”  40
 This patriotism, as Rousseau conceived it, was distinct from nation-
alism. Whereas patriotism involved loyalty to the republic founded on 
citizenship and participation in the general will, nationalism entailed 
loyalty to a nation, often defined by a common language, ethnicity, 
culture, history and so on. Whereas patriotism demanded loyalty to a 
small republic, nationalism called for a large nation-state coterminous 
with the entire nation. These distinctions are important, as neither the 
concept of nationality nor the idea of a nation-state were prevalent at 
the time Rousseau was writing. But Rousseau was clearly heading in 
their direction: when he advised the Poles to organize their country as a 
federation of small republics, he was adapting his political theory to the 
emerging world of nationalism. For Rousseau, the general will ex-
pressed what was common to all members of the republic, it represent-
ed the will of the whole. To move from this notion of popular sover-
eignty to nationalism required only a small step. Once the nation was 
equated with the people, the general will expressed the national will. It 
followed that the nation must be as unified as the republic, without 
sections or divided loyalties. It, too, must be a public person with a sin-
gle will. 
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4 
 If Rousseau brought western political thinking to the verge of the 
nation-state, Fichte crossed the line. His Addresses to the German Nation 
ranks as one of the classic texts of European nationalism. Much of 
Fichte’s political thinking, by way of Rousseau, came out of the republi-
can tradition and established a unique political language for discussing 
the nation-state. Although Fichte largely abandoned the vocabulary of 
civic humanism, overlaying it with notions of soil, race and language, 
he retained enough of the earlier tradition for the republican contours 
of his thought to remain visible. He envisioned the nation, much as 
Rousseau had envisioned the republic, as a uniform body animated by a 
single will in which private interests yielded to the common good. Also 
like Rousseau, he recognized that the nation would be vulnerable be-
cause it was part of the international system, and that its best defense 
would be to call on the patriotism of individual citizens. The reason for 
drawing these parallels is not to reduce Fichte’s Addresses to a replica of 
Rousseau’s Social Contract—the Addresses are far too original and com-
plex for that—but rather to demonstrate the suitability of republican 
discourse for articulating the aspirations of the emerging nation-state. 
 Johann Gottlieb Fichte delivered his fourteen Addresses to the Ger-
man Nation in Berlin, between December 1807 and March 1808, as 
Prussia suffered under Napoleonic occupation. The state system in the 
early nineteenth century, just like its eighteenth-century predecessor, 
was subject to aggression, and Napoleon was every bit as intent on con-
quest as Frederick the Great had been. Control of the German states 
played a crucial role in Napoleon’s foreign policy. Revolutionary armies 
had already extended French domination as far as the Rhine, and 
Napoleon continued the process, defeating Prussia decisively in the bat-
tles of Jena and Auerstedt (October 1806). For Germans like Fichte, 
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Prussia’s humiliation was palpable: Frederick William III had taken 
flight to East Prussia as French armies entered Berlin and the Prussian 
kingdom and its army were reduced to shadows of their former selves.  41
Fichte, who had escaped eastward with the king, later returned to occu-
pied Berlin in order to deliver what he knew would be a set of subver-
sive lectures. His Addresses, then, can be read as a response to the 
Napoleonic conquest. The question they posed and the answer they 
gave both echoed Rousseau: how could the German people defend 
themselves in a world of predatory empires? Fichte’s answer: they must 
become a nation. 
 Germans at the time, especially younger intellectuals, were fascinat-
ed by Rousseau as a philosopher of alienation, and Fichte was no excep-
tion. His origins were modest: his father made a living by weaving and 
farming. He owed his education to an act of upper-class charity, when a 
passing nobleman noticed his talent and took charge of his schooling. 
As a young tutor, with little chance of meaningful employment, Fichte 
felt estranged from the bourgeois and aristocratic society of his patrons. 
This sense of marginality, of being an outsider in Germany’s society of 
orders, drew Fichte to Rousseau, especially to his indictment of the cor-
ruption blighting modern society.  When the French Revolution broke 42
out, Fichte became a supporter and published in its defense a Contribu-
tion toward Rectifying the Judgment of the Public on the French Revolution 
(1793), a work that drew inspiration from Rousseau’s Social Contract. 
Whereas German opponents of the Revolution had routinely vilified 
Rousseau, Fichte set out to vindicate him, declaring that he had already 
“awakened” the “human spirit” and suggesting that Kant’s philosophy 
had completed the work that he had begun.  From that moment on, 43
Rousseau’s Social Contract became a point of departure for much of 
Fichte’s political thinking. 
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 The French Revolution set the groundwork for Fichte’s proposed 
revitalization of the German nation. Before the Revolution, Germany 
had been a congeries of some three hundred independent states, some 
large, some small. Germany’s fatal weakness, Fichte told his audience, 
lay in this political and moral fragmentation. Individualism and self-
interest, what he called “material self-seeking,” had characterized the old 
order, as princes cared only about their own states, not the whole of 
Germany, and as citizens turned their backs on their neighbors. But this 
entire edifice had now collapsed before the French—“self-seeking” had 
been “destroyed by its own complete development”—and on its ruins 
Germans would create a new nation. The Revolution, in defeating the 
old Germany, had in effect cleared the ground for Germany’s recovery.  44
Fichte aimed his Addresses at all Germans, despite their apparent divi-
sions, and he declared in true republican fashion that they must not 
look to outsiders for help, but must learn to help themselves. The 
means he proposed for doing this entailed the “fashioning of an entirely 
new self.” He wanted “to mold the Germans into a corporate body, 
which shall be stimulated and animated in all its individual members by 
a common interest.”  So, in response to the French invasion, Fichte 45
called on the German speaking peoples to come together as a single 
nation through a process of incorporation that would subsume individ-
ual self-interest in the general will and give meaning to all its members 
by directing their efforts toward something larger than themselves. Here 
was Rousseau’s idea of the social contract applied to the nation. 
 Fichte insisted on the same degree of uniformity for the nation as 
Rousseau had demanded for the republic. A German essence, he said, 
rooted in race and language, had endured despite the calamities be-
falling the German people and would provide the source of this uni-
formity. Germans were a Teutonic people, a “branch of the Teutonic 
race.” They were distinct from other Teutons because they had re-
mained in their ancestral “dwelling places,” and because they had “re-
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tained and developed the original language of the ancestral stock.”  46
The role of language was absolutely crucial here, for it provided the in-
strument that created and sustained nations. “Men are formed by lan-
guage,” Fichte said, “far more than language is formed by men.”  Lan47 -
guages, according to Fichte, existed independently of the people who 
spoke them, and the ideas they contained deep within their fabric made 
their speakers the people they were. Ancestral languages, developing 
continuously and without foreign accretions, had the power therefore 
to perpetuate nations. An idea of German nationality—what Fichte 
described as the “sum total of the sensuous and mental life of the na-
tion”—had been “deposited” in the German language, transforming all 
who spoke it into Germans and guaranteeing the uniformity that would 
allow the nation to form a single corporate body with a single will.  48
 Much like Rousseau, Fichte emphasized the importance of educa-
tion for refashioning the German self. The process of molding the 
German people into a nation would require “a total change of the exist-
ing system of education.” Whereas the old system had been suitable for 
an age of material self-seeking, the new system would transform this 
self-seeking into an quest for the common good. It would teach its stu-
dents that freedom did not consist in doing as they pleased, but rather 
in pursuing the interests of the nation as a whole. Education, in other 
words, would compel them to be free, now that freedom was properly 
understood as conforming to the national will.  Whereas Rousseau had 49
simply stated that citizens of the republic who refused to obey the gen-
eral will would be “constrained to do so,” Fichte specified the means for 
ensuring obedience: “The education proposed by me, therefore, is to be 
a reliable and deliberate art for fashioning in man a stable and infallible 
good will.”  50
 We can read Fichte’s Addresses as an expression of what Isaiah Berlin 
has termed positive liberty: the freedom to live a meaningful life by de-
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veloping one’s best self according to the standards of the community to 
which one belongs.  Though he did not use the term, Fichte articulat51 -
ed the concept in his discussion of the need to educate the will. For 
Fichte, doing as one pleased was not exercising freedom, but rather re-
sponding to earthly appetites. True freedom, on the contrary, meant 
living according to one’s essence; and in the context of the Addresses, 
this meant living as a German. So, when Fichte proposed his new sys-
tem of education and called on the rising generation of Germans to 
discipline their collective will, he was asking them to exercise their free-
dom in a positive sense by awakening their German essence.  In the 52
process, they would give their lives meaning. Outside the national 
community, they would remain isolated as individuals; but within it, 
they would become one with the ever-flowing stream of national life. At 
times, Fichte gave this thought a mystical rendering. The German na-
tion, he said, existed eternally as a transcendent idea that became real as 
each generation disciplined its will and directed it toward the common 
good. This process of bringing the German nation to life was never end-
ing, as each new generation picked up where the previous had left off, 
and it provided access to the divine. For Fichte, nations were earthly 
reflections of the divine order, they were a “totality of men” arising “out 
of the divine” and embodying it in their “national character.” As Ger-
mans labored to create their nation, they exercised their freedom by 
bringing the divine to bear on earth.  53
 Fichte’s understanding of the nation as the embodiment of the di-
vine order might appear far removed from the more worldly republican 
traditions with which we began this essay. And yet, Fichte was con-
vinced that the German nation would express itself politically in repub-
lican institutions. Germans would succeed, he predicted, where the 
French revolutionaries had failed: they would create the perfect state. 
Whereas the French were mired in the age of self-seeking, the Germans 
would undergo Fichte’s rigorous system of education and readily em-
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brace republican institutions. “Only the nation which has first solved in 
actual practice the problem of educating perfect men will then solve 
also the problem of the perfect state,” he told his audience.  History 54
had demonstrated that republican institutions, though alien to the 
French, were natural to the Germans, whose past abounded with re-
publics. The imperial cities of the Hanseatic League had developed 
“civic constitutions and organizations which, though but on a small 
scale, were nonetheless of high excellence….” The German burghers 
had been true republicans, exercising civic virtue, sacrificing self-interest 
for the common weal. The Germans, Fichte concluded, were the only 
modern European nation “that has shown in practice, by the example 
of its burgher class for centuries, that it is capable of enduring a repub-
lican constitution.”  For Fichte, then, the nation and the republic were 55
opposite sides of the same coin. The nation became synonymous with 
the republic, an association in which individuals put self-interest aside, 
submerged themselves in the general will, and worked for the common 
good.  
 Now that he had embraced republican institutions, Fichte faced the 
same question as Rousseau: how was the republic to defend itself? For 
Fichte, the international order was just as predatory as it had been for 
Rousseau. It was an aggressive system in which Germany had historical-
ly served as the chief battleground and German unity had been the 
chief victim. Just think of the Thirty Years War or the wars of Frederick 
the Great, in which the European powers had used the German states as 
pawns in their quests for supremacy.  So, how was the German nation, 56
organized as a republic, to defeat its enemies? His answer: patriotism, or 
what he called love of fatherland. “…He to whom a fatherland has been 
handed down … fights to the last drop of his blood to hand on the pre-
cious possession unimpaired to his posterity. So it always has been.” 
This was especially true when the fatherland was understood as an ema-
nation of the divine order and its survival as the citizen’s best guarantee 
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of eternity on earth. The ancient Romans, the original Teutons, and the 
German Protestants at the Reformation had all fought for that sense of 
eternity.  As before, Fichte’s language often crossed into the mystical, 57
but his conception of patriotism fell right into line with classical think-
ing. Like Machiavelli and Rousseau, he called on the republic’s citizens 
to abandon their selfish impulses and provide for its defense. An armed 
people would accomplish what no standing army had. Fichte may have 
started his lectures with the observation that individual self-seeking had 
allowed Napoleon to conquer, but he ended them with the prediction 
that a love of fatherland, aroused by his new system of education, 
would enable Germany finally to achieve its independence.  58
5 
 This discussion of Fichte’s Addresses has demonstrated just how easi-
ly Rousseau’s republican discourse could be adapted to the new nation-
alism. Whereas Rousseau had conceptualized the republic, Fichte ap-
plied this conceptualization to the nation, an institution that would 
shape so much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The parallels 
between the two were quite profound. Both Rousseau and Fichte envi-
sioned a political community based on an act of incorporation in which 
private citizens merged their individual wills into a general will, creating 
a single public person. This act of incorporation was preserved through 
education, through shaping the individual will, through coercion even, 
since neither Rousseau nor Fichte allowed deviance from the general 
will. It ensured that the community achieved unity and pursued a 
common goal. What individuals lost in terms of personal freedom—the 
ability to do as they pleased—they gained in terms of moral sensibility. 
Citizens, now partaking in the general will, became moral agents, lead-
ing meaningful lives, an integral part of their community. This insis-
tence on uniformity played an even greater role when the republic or 
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nation was contemplated not abstractly, but as part of the international 
system, which both theorists recognized as predatory. Both Rousseau 
and Fichte appreciated the republic’s precariousness, and drawing on a 
long tradition of republican thinking, called on the patriotism of citi-
zens—patriotism inculcated and strengthened through civic educa-
tion—to defend the republic. 
 Right at the center of their thinking, however, lay a disturbing 
paradox: Rousseau and Fichte both argued that individuals, in placing 
themselves under the general will, suffered no loss of freedom. For 
Rousseau, the citizen gave himself to no one when he gave himself to 
everyone. For Fichte, the German did nothing more than renounce his 
lower self when he submitted to the demands of the nation. This sur-
render of the individual will was crucial for both because it created the 
unity that the republic or nation required if it were to survive as a 
community capable of providing its members with purposeful lives. 
And yet, it is not at all clear what they meant when they claimed that 
the individual suffered no loss of freedom. This lack of clarity did not 
escape contemporaries. Benjamin Constant, writing in 1810, just a few 
years after Fichte delivered his Addresses, considered Rousseau’s theory a 
rhetorical sleight of hand.  He was absolutely certain that it assigned 59
tremendous power to the agents who implemented the general will: “…
in handing yourself over to everyone else, it is certainly not true that 
you are giving yourself to no one,” he wrote in his Principles of Politics. 
“On the contrary, it is to surrender yourself to those who act in the 
name of all. It follows that in handing yourself over entirely, you do not 
enter a universally equal condition, since some people profit exclusively 
from the sacrifice of the rest.”  If Rousseau conceived of the republic as 60
a public person, then Constant warned that this public person had the 
power to oppress those who stood in its way; and as an illustration of 
how this power could be abused, he demonstrated just how easy it 
would be for such a government to persecute an unwanted minority.  61
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 Constant also questioned the relevance of Rousseau’s Social Con-
tract to the emerging nineteenth century. Rather than speak to the 
modern world, it appeared to share far more with the ancient Greek 
and Roman republics, which were small, culturally uniform, and outfit-
ted for war. “Our world is precisely the opposite of the ancient one,” 
Constant observed in his Principles. “Everything in antiquity related to 
war. Today everything is reckoned in terms of peace. In former times 
each people was an isolated family, born hostile to other families. Now 
a mass of people lives under different names and diverse modes of social 
organization….”  The state system whose beginnings Rousseau had 62
sketched in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality resembled closely 
the age of Frederick the Great, when princes went to war to conquer 
territory and defend their reputations. Within this context, a warlike 
republic that was compact, uniform, and animated by a single will 
might have made sense. But if applied to the new nationalism—and we 
have just followed its traces through Fichte’s Addresses to the German 
Nation—then it might easily have conduced to politics that were bel-
ligerent, exclusive, and authoritarian. 
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